May 28, 2010
Cabell County Clerk, Commission Admit to Changing One Precinct After Random Drawing Due to Relative in Precinct
Video Elicits More Questions Than Telephonic Quorum
By Tony Rutherford
Huntingtonnews.net Reporter
Huntington, WV (HNN) – Video of the Friday, May 14, board of election commissioners random precinct drawing in Cabell County contradicts , in part, from the precincts selected for canvass. Due to audio muffling during the drawing (which could be electronically removed by an election overseer such as the F.B.I.), the variance is one or two precincts.
The Cabell County Commission and the County Clerk admit in a story in Friday’s Herald-Dispatch that one precinct substitution was made.
HNN had an informed source obtain the precinct recount designations from the Cabell County Circuit Clerk’s Office on Tuesday , May 18. They conform with the precincts listed in the H-D: 11 B, 37, 30 , 67 . However , the one’s drawn on Friday from the paper bag as viewed on the Terri Ann Smith video have been interpreted by some listeners as 4, 7, 30, and 37.
In fact, from her vantage point, Ms. Smith stated numbers slightly different than those determined by HNN and others when listening to the tape.
Ms. Smith, in an email, wrote that County Clerk Karen Cole on Monday, May 17, told her that “one of the counters’ relatives voted in [one of the precincts selected Friday] so they had to pick again.”
Smith asserted that the precinct number where the relative worked did end with a 4.
But does the video contain the drawing of Precincts 4, 7, 30, 37 or 30, 37, 64 and 67? Watch and listen.
Based on legal research and a recent Ethics Committee statement, the attendance at the meeting via telephone is acceptable as long as those in attendance can hear the person on the phone and vice versa. The tape shows the speaker being adjusted to ensure that audience members can hear the initial speaker (Bob Bailey) and the subsequent speaker (Scott Bias).
As for the admitted late substitution of a precinct, Ms. Cole told the Herald-Dispatch that hours after the May 14 drawing the County Commission’s office informed her that one of 16 people selected for hand counting had a relative running for delegate district or an executive committee position. Those are precinct specific position, according to the article. As a result, the article stated that Cole and the County commissioners “decided to discard precinct 64 and randomly select another precinct. She [Cole] said a new precinct --- 11 B --- was drawn on the morning of May 17, during the canvassing board meeting.”
Smith contends: “I arrived at 9:00am sharp Monday morning--not late this time. Karen's people were at each of the tables guiding the counters. The paperwork was already prepared for the counters. "Someone" had already gone to the warehouse to get the ballot tapes for the precincts. So, I wasn't able to witness any of this as it was done before the publicized time.”
A search of election cases decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals revealed that the court decided a case involving an incumbent’s sister serving illegally as a poll worker. Barr v. Gainer, 203 WV 379, 508 S.E.2d 96 (WV 1998) details a Calhoun County Commission race where the relative worked in precinct seven. The precinct vote count was 164 for Gainer and 130 votes for challenger David Barr. The final result was Gainer by 27 votes, 1,325 to 1,298.
The court found that a poll workers service “had a chilling effect on the free expression of the will of the voters in Precinct 7. We find that there is convincing evidence that the result of the election was, in fact, affected by this misconduct.”
The court invalidated votes from Precinct 7 after reports from voters that her service was not proper as she [the illegal worker] in one voter’s mind could “know for whom I voted.”
Under the circumstances, the W.Va. Supreme Court held “when the sibling of a candidate for public office serves as a poll worker in a precinct where the candidate's name is on the ballot, in violation of W.Va.Code § 3-1-28(a)(5) (1993), and there is evidence that the sibling's presence at the polls prevented a free and full expression of the voters' will and affected the result of the election, all votes cast in that precinct for that office are rendered invalid and should be disallowed.
“In so ruling, we underscore that our foremost concern in the resolution of election disputes is the preservation of the sanctity of the vote. Thus, while even the partial disenfranchisement of voters should not be undertaken without all due caution, this Court will not countenance misconduct which imperils the voters' choice. We uphold the circuit court's order because it advances these ideals.”
Click HERE to download the WV Supreme Court Case.
ELECTRONIC MACHINES
Before moving forward, our purpose remains in the words of the late sports writer, Ernie Salvatore, “Pardon me, I was just asking.” Our inquiry focuses not on an individual, but on the potential for the electronic machines themselves to not render an accurate count.
WV election law stipulates that when electronic machines are used, one percent of the vote must be counted by hand to verify the accuracy of the computer tabulations.
AMBIGUOUS VIDEO; WHY DID NO ONE ELSE ATTEND?
We emphasize again, the Smith video leaves significant questions unanswered. The video (without commentary) must speak for itself as does the admitted substitution of Precinct 11 B.
One observation: Since the canvas and drawing were open to the public, why did not other community minded members join Ms. Smith and officials there? If more people were present at these open meetings, there would not have been so many possible explanations and questions about the video.
OUTCOMES ELSEWHERE RELATED TO RANDOM
During the 2004 election, Ohio became a hot potato. The state had numerous reported issues related to determining so-called random recounts. In one instance, the ease of recounting was given for precinct selection.
The document “The Case for Fraud in Ohio Election 2004” presents non-random selection of precincts as ONE form of irregularity along with voter intimidation, voting machine shortages, poorly designed absentee ballots, restricting citizen access to election records, more votes than voters, and chain of custody issues involving voting machines and failure to follow established recount procedures.
For edification purposes, here are some non-random outcomes of that Ohio election process that became troublesome.
(For the full premier on the Ohio Election, click: http://www.bpac.info/Votefraud/OhioFraud.html.)
Non-Random Selection of Precincts
(Editor’s Note: This portion comes directly from the Ohio article.)
The "volunteer manual" that the Green Party observers received says "the board must randomly select whole precincts whose total equals at least 3% of the total vote." Ideal random selection of precincts occurred in Gallia County: The name of each precinct was put on a slip of paper, the slips were put into a hat and drawn one at a time until a sufficient number of precincts had been drawn that made up 3% of the county-wide vote. The precincts selected for the recount were, however, not randomly selected for over 80 out of the 88 counties.
The Boards of Election in most Ohio counties, however, pre-selected the precinct(s) that would be hand counted several days before the count. Thus employees and, in some cases, the voting machine company technicians, knew in advance the precincts that would be hand counted. In almost all cases in which observers requested that precincts be selected randomly at the beginning of the recount they were denied. In Allen County, Mr. Keith Cunningham, Director of the Board of Elections, explained that it would take considerably longer to carry out the recount if there were a random selection process employed.
In many counties precincts selected were chosen based on size. In Greene County, three precincts were chosen (31, 224, and 442), one for each counting team, that were approximately the same size and that were the right size to add up to the required 3% minimum for hand recount. It was pointed out by those familiar with the population of the precincts that the choices seemed to be very calculated based on ease of recount.
In Cuyahoga County, precinct selection was done on the basis of only choosing precincts with 550 or more votes in a cross-section of areas (one East side, one West side, one affluent, one non-affluent). According to Professor Cyrus Taylor (Case Western Reserve University), this selection criterion meant that only 8% of all precincts qualified for having their ballots closely examined in the hand recount, and that the "small fraction of precincts are not reflective of the county as a whole. Overall, the qualifying precincts have significantly higher proportion of votes for Bush than for Kerry, yet the county voted for Kerry by a 2:1 margin…. The vast majority of precincts have less than 550 ballots cast. It is thus possible in principle to fiddle with the returns from most of the county without fear that they would be checked in the hand recount of 3% of the returns."
In Hocking County the Board decided to only consider the precincts in which the vote totals for Bush and Kerry were similar. The Green Party observer objected, stating that selecting a precinct without a large difference in totals wasn't a random selection. The Board did not change their selection method.
AUDITING THE OUTCOMES
To emphasize the difficulty of risk-limiting post election audits, a working paper, “Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/ Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2009” examines the challenges and practical logistics of four pilot projects in California where the authors contend that laws “fall short.” They eventually propose a “bare bones” less efficient audit.
This study was partially funded by the National Science Foundation. It contains complex mathematical formulas for determining accuracies in the counties tested. The study was conducted with the full assistance of the county clerks in the counties.
Although elaborate formulas and audits were conducts --- with listed expenses varying from about $1,500 to under $5,000 --- the scholars concluded by recommending a simplistic audit method which contains “triggers” pertaining to types of hand re-counts.
Three audit levels are considered:
BASIC AUDIT: A fixed percentage of batches from every race is hand counted. If that count reveals errors, the entire race is counted by hand. The basic level of audition could be very low, e.g. 0.5% of batches to limit workload.
FULL RECOUNT TRIGGER: Any contest with a sufficiently small margin is counted by hand in its entirety. The margin that triggers the “full count” should be coupled with the accuracy of the original tabulation technology.
RANDOM FULL HAND COUNT: Every race has some possibility of being counted by hand entirely. That probability could depend on size of the race and margin.
Download, the 25 page academic paper by clicking HERE.
Share This Story:
Make HNN Your Homepage (IE Users Only)
Cabell County Clerk, Commission Admit to Changing One Precinct After Random Drawing Due to Relative in Precinct
Video Elicits More Questions Than Telephonic Quorum
By Tony Rutherford
Huntingtonnews.net Reporter
Huntington, WV (HNN) – Video of the Friday, May 14, board of election commissioners random precinct drawing in Cabell County contradicts , in part, from the precincts selected for canvass. Due to audio muffling during the drawing (which could be electronically removed by an election overseer such as the F.B.I.), the variance is one or two precincts.
The Cabell County Commission and the County Clerk admit in a story in Friday’s Herald-Dispatch that one precinct substitution was made.
HNN had an informed source obtain the precinct recount designations from the Cabell County Circuit Clerk’s Office on Tuesday , May 18. They conform with the precincts listed in the H-D: 11 B, 37, 30 , 67 . However , the one’s drawn on Friday from the paper bag as viewed on the Terri Ann Smith video have been interpreted by some listeners as 4, 7, 30, and 37.
In fact, from her vantage point, Ms. Smith stated numbers slightly different than those determined by HNN and others when listening to the tape.
Ms. Smith, in an email, wrote that County Clerk Karen Cole on Monday, May 17, told her that “one of the counters’ relatives voted in [one of the precincts selected Friday] so they had to pick again.”
Smith asserted that the precinct number where the relative worked did end with a 4.
But does the video contain the drawing of Precincts 4, 7, 30, 37 or 30, 37, 64 and 67? Watch and listen.
Based on legal research and a recent Ethics Committee statement, the attendance at the meeting via telephone is acceptable as long as those in attendance can hear the person on the phone and vice versa. The tape shows the speaker being adjusted to ensure that audience members can hear the initial speaker (Bob Bailey) and the subsequent speaker (Scott Bias).
As for the admitted late substitution of a precinct, Ms. Cole told the Herald-Dispatch that hours after the May 14 drawing the County Commission’s office informed her that one of 16 people selected for hand counting had a relative running for delegate district or an executive committee position. Those are precinct specific position, according to the article. As a result, the article stated that Cole and the County commissioners “decided to discard precinct 64 and randomly select another precinct. She [Cole] said a new precinct --- 11 B --- was drawn on the morning of May 17, during the canvassing board meeting.”
Smith contends: “I arrived at 9:00am sharp Monday morning--not late this time. Karen's people were at each of the tables guiding the counters. The paperwork was already prepared for the counters. "Someone" had already gone to the warehouse to get the ballot tapes for the precincts. So, I wasn't able to witness any of this as it was done before the publicized time.”
A search of election cases decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals revealed that the court decided a case involving an incumbent’s sister serving illegally as a poll worker. Barr v. Gainer, 203 WV 379, 508 S.E.2d 96 (WV 1998) details a Calhoun County Commission race where the relative worked in precinct seven. The precinct vote count was 164 for Gainer and 130 votes for challenger David Barr. The final result was Gainer by 27 votes, 1,325 to 1,298.
The court found that a poll workers service “had a chilling effect on the free expression of the will of the voters in Precinct 7. We find that there is convincing evidence that the result of the election was, in fact, affected by this misconduct.”
The court invalidated votes from Precinct 7 after reports from voters that her service was not proper as she [the illegal worker] in one voter’s mind could “know for whom I voted.”
Under the circumstances, the W.Va. Supreme Court held “when the sibling of a candidate for public office serves as a poll worker in a precinct where the candidate's name is on the ballot, in violation of W.Va.Code § 3-1-28(a)(5) (1993), and there is evidence that the sibling's presence at the polls prevented a free and full expression of the voters' will and affected the result of the election, all votes cast in that precinct for that office are rendered invalid and should be disallowed.
“In so ruling, we underscore that our foremost concern in the resolution of election disputes is the preservation of the sanctity of the vote. Thus, while even the partial disenfranchisement of voters should not be undertaken without all due caution, this Court will not countenance misconduct which imperils the voters' choice. We uphold the circuit court's order because it advances these ideals.”
Click HERE to download the WV Supreme Court Case.
ELECTRONIC MACHINES
Before moving forward, our purpose remains in the words of the late sports writer, Ernie Salvatore, “Pardon me, I was just asking.” Our inquiry focuses not on an individual, but on the potential for the electronic machines themselves to not render an accurate count.
WV election law stipulates that when electronic machines are used, one percent of the vote must be counted by hand to verify the accuracy of the computer tabulations.
AMBIGUOUS VIDEO; WHY DID NO ONE ELSE ATTEND?
We emphasize again, the Smith video leaves significant questions unanswered. The video (without commentary) must speak for itself as does the admitted substitution of Precinct 11 B.
One observation: Since the canvas and drawing were open to the public, why did not other community minded members join Ms. Smith and officials there? If more people were present at these open meetings, there would not have been so many possible explanations and questions about the video.
OUTCOMES ELSEWHERE RELATED TO RANDOM
During the 2004 election, Ohio became a hot potato. The state had numerous reported issues related to determining so-called random recounts. In one instance, the ease of recounting was given for precinct selection.
The document “The Case for Fraud in Ohio Election 2004” presents non-random selection of precincts as ONE form of irregularity along with voter intimidation, voting machine shortages, poorly designed absentee ballots, restricting citizen access to election records, more votes than voters, and chain of custody issues involving voting machines and failure to follow established recount procedures.
For edification purposes, here are some non-random outcomes of that Ohio election process that became troublesome.
(For the full premier on the Ohio Election, click: http://www.bpac.info/Votefraud/OhioFraud.html.)
Non-Random Selection of Precincts
(Editor’s Note: This portion comes directly from the Ohio article.)
The "volunteer manual" that the Green Party observers received says "the board must randomly select whole precincts whose total equals at least 3% of the total vote." Ideal random selection of precincts occurred in Gallia County: The name of each precinct was put on a slip of paper, the slips were put into a hat and drawn one at a time until a sufficient number of precincts had been drawn that made up 3% of the county-wide vote. The precincts selected for the recount were, however, not randomly selected for over 80 out of the 88 counties.
The Boards of Election in most Ohio counties, however, pre-selected the precinct(s) that would be hand counted several days before the count. Thus employees and, in some cases, the voting machine company technicians, knew in advance the precincts that would be hand counted. In almost all cases in which observers requested that precincts be selected randomly at the beginning of the recount they were denied. In Allen County, Mr. Keith Cunningham, Director of the Board of Elections, explained that it would take considerably longer to carry out the recount if there were a random selection process employed.
In many counties precincts selected were chosen based on size. In Greene County, three precincts were chosen (31, 224, and 442), one for each counting team, that were approximately the same size and that were the right size to add up to the required 3% minimum for hand recount. It was pointed out by those familiar with the population of the precincts that the choices seemed to be very calculated based on ease of recount.
In Cuyahoga County, precinct selection was done on the basis of only choosing precincts with 550 or more votes in a cross-section of areas (one East side, one West side, one affluent, one non-affluent). According to Professor Cyrus Taylor (Case Western Reserve University), this selection criterion meant that only 8% of all precincts qualified for having their ballots closely examined in the hand recount, and that the "small fraction of precincts are not reflective of the county as a whole. Overall, the qualifying precincts have significantly higher proportion of votes for Bush than for Kerry, yet the county voted for Kerry by a 2:1 margin…. The vast majority of precincts have less than 550 ballots cast. It is thus possible in principle to fiddle with the returns from most of the county without fear that they would be checked in the hand recount of 3% of the returns."
In Hocking County the Board decided to only consider the precincts in which the vote totals for Bush and Kerry were similar. The Green Party observer objected, stating that selecting a precinct without a large difference in totals wasn't a random selection. The Board did not change their selection method.
AUDITING THE OUTCOMES
To emphasize the difficulty of risk-limiting post election audits, a working paper, “Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/ Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2009” examines the challenges and practical logistics of four pilot projects in California where the authors contend that laws “fall short.” They eventually propose a “bare bones” less efficient audit.
This study was partially funded by the National Science Foundation. It contains complex mathematical formulas for determining accuracies in the counties tested. The study was conducted with the full assistance of the county clerks in the counties.
Although elaborate formulas and audits were conducts --- with listed expenses varying from about $1,500 to under $5,000 --- the scholars concluded by recommending a simplistic audit method which contains “triggers” pertaining to types of hand re-counts.
Three audit levels are considered:
BASIC AUDIT: A fixed percentage of batches from every race is hand counted. If that count reveals errors, the entire race is counted by hand. The basic level of audition could be very low, e.g. 0.5% of batches to limit workload.
FULL RECOUNT TRIGGER: Any contest with a sufficiently small margin is counted by hand in its entirety. The margin that triggers the “full count” should be coupled with the accuracy of the original tabulation technology.
RANDOM FULL HAND COUNT: Every race has some possibility of being counted by hand entirely. That probability could depend on size of the race and margin.
Download, the 25 page academic paper by clicking HERE.
Share This Story:
Make HNN Your Homepage (IE Users Only)
