Dec. 27, 2010
BOOK REVIEW: Oil Industry Insider Provides In-Depth Probe of Deepwater Horizon/BP Explosion in 'Disaster on the Horizon'
Reviewed By David M. Kinchen
On Dec. 26, 2010 the New York Times published an exhaustive, extremely long examination of the April 20 Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill -- the largest oil spill/environmental disaster in the nation's history. Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26spill.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=a2.
The Times concluded that: "... this was a disaster with two distinct parts — first a blowout, then the destruction of the Horizon. The second part, which killed 11 people and injured dozens, has escaped intense scrutiny, as if it were an inevitable casualty of the blowout. It was not. Nearly 400 feet long, the Horizon had formidable and redundant defenses against even the worst blowout. It was equipped to divert surging oil and gas safely away from the rig. It had devices to quickly seal off a well blowout or to break free from it. It had systems to prevent gas from exploding and sophisticated alarms that would quickly warn the crew at the slightest trace of gas. The crew itself routinely practiced responding to alarms, fires and blowouts, and it was blessed with experienced leaders who clearly cared about safety. On paper, experts and investigators agree, the Deepwater Horizon should have weathered this blowout. This is the story of how and why it didn’t."
Oil industry veteran Bob Cavnar reached the same conclusion months ago and writes about it in a book published in October, "Disaster on the Horizon" (Chelsea Green Publishing, White River Junction, VT, 224 pages, $14.95). It's worth reading, along with the New York Times' account, which is "based on interviews with 21 Horizon crew members and on sworn testimony and written statements from nearly all of the other 94 people who escaped the rig. Their accounts, along with thousands of documents obtained by The New York Times describing the rig’s maintenance and operations, make it possible to finally piece together the Horizon’s last hours," according to The Times.
Cavnar's "Disaster on the Horizon" is one of the first comprehensive examinations of the causes of the disaster -- but it won't be the last, as the New York Times story shows. There's sure to be a federal report on the incident and I hope it won't whitewash the lack of industry and government preparedness that the April 20 explosion uncovered. I've already reviewed another book on the disaster, "Drowning in Oil" by Houston Chronicle business reporter Loren Steffy (link: http://archives.huntingtonnews.net/columns/101207-kinchen-columnsbookreview.html)
Cavnar, in the bluntest possible language, delivers a hard-hitting portrait of industry and government woefully unprepared to respond. A plain-spoken man who's risen from field hand to CEO, Cavnar witnessed the carelessness of the industry first hand when he was burned by a gas well fire in 1981. "Disaster on the Horizon" reveals explosive details: Collusion between BP and the government to hide the severity of the spill. The blowout preventer technology details -- why it failed. The behind-the-scenes story of the Obama administration's $20 billion deal with BP. How BP blamed others for their mistakes. BP's corner cutting on safety. The risky top kill procedure. Obama's failure to take advice from industry experts. "Disaster on the Horizon" provides a road map for ensuring this never happens again, if only those responsible will follow it -- something that is not inevitable due to the "not invented here" (NIH) mindset of bureaucrats: NIH means if they don't come up with the idea, it doesn't exist.
Cavnar slams his own industry for ignoring safety improvements and lobbying to end the moratorium on off-shore drilling as quickly as possible. His conclusion: Technology must be vastly improved before deep water drilling resumes. The industry had a chance to get started on this during the moratorium, but delayed and lobbied instead. Tougher regulations on deep water drilling should be enacted-in technology, disaster preparedness, and response operations. A comprehensive energy policy that creates a favorable environment for full-scale alternative energy development and conservation must be crafted.
Cavnar on the blowout of BP's Mississippi Canyon Block 252 well: "This is a tragedy that simply did not have to happen It was caused by bad design, bad judgment, hurried operations, and a convuluted management structure. Add in silenced alarms and disabled safety systems, and the result was inevitable." Above all, he adds near the end of his indispensible book: "I personally believe the cause was primarily human error; the managers on the rig simply failed to listen to the well as it became more and more dangerous." Listen to the well? Yes, Cavnar says that "In the oil and gas industry, many -- including me -- believe that wells can talk; you simply have to understand the language they're speaking and what they are saying."
In other words, the April 20 Deepwater Horizon/BP event was no accident, but a tragedy driven by the multiple mistakes -- a "perfect storm" of mistakes.
"Disaster on the Horizon" takes readers inside the disaster, exposing the decisions leading up to the blowout and the immediate aftermath. It includes personal accounts of the survivors, assembled from testimony during various investigations, as well as personal interviews with survivors, witnesses, and family. It also provides a layman's look at the industry, its technology, people, and risks. It deconstructs events and decisions made by BP, Transocean, and the US Government before and after the disaster, and the effects of those decisions, both good and bad. Cavnar explains what happened in the Gulf, explores how we arrived at deep water drilling in the first place and then charts a course for how to avoid these disasters in the future. The diagrams and illustrations explain the events much better than tose on the TV accounts I watched daily. "Disaster on the Horizon" is dedicated to the 11 men who died in the disaster. They're named and each is provided with a mini-biography.
In its comprehensive report on the disaster -- which I recommend to all readers of this review -- The Times comes to basically the same conclusion as Cavnar: "... crew members died and suffered terrible injuries because every one of the Horizon’s defenses failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all. At critical moments that night, members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive steps needed. Communications fell apart, warning signs were missed and crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response. The result, the interviews and records show, was paralysis. For nine long minutes, as the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge, no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave."
About the author
Bob Cavnar is a 30-year veteran of the oil and gas industry with deep experience in operations, start-ups, turn-arounds, and management of both public and private companies. He is currently chief executive officer of Luca Technologies, which harnesses natural processes to produce natural gas sustainably. Previously he was President and Chief Executive Officer of Milagro Exploration, a large, privately held oil and gas exploration firm based in Houston with operations along the Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi Gulf Coasts, and offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Cavnar holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Southern Methodist University in Dallas.
Publisher's web site: www.chelseagreen.com
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BOOK REVIEW: Oil Industry Insider Provides In-Depth Probe of Deepwater Horizon/BP Explosion in 'Disaster on the Horizon'
Reviewed By David M. Kinchen
On Dec. 26, 2010 the New York Times published an exhaustive, extremely long examination of the April 20 Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill -- the largest oil spill/environmental disaster in the nation's history. Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26spill.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=a2.
The Times concluded that: "... this was a disaster with two distinct parts — first a blowout, then the destruction of the Horizon. The second part, which killed 11 people and injured dozens, has escaped intense scrutiny, as if it were an inevitable casualty of the blowout. It was not. Nearly 400 feet long, the Horizon had formidable and redundant defenses against even the worst blowout. It was equipped to divert surging oil and gas safely away from the rig. It had devices to quickly seal off a well blowout or to break free from it. It had systems to prevent gas from exploding and sophisticated alarms that would quickly warn the crew at the slightest trace of gas. The crew itself routinely practiced responding to alarms, fires and blowouts, and it was blessed with experienced leaders who clearly cared about safety. On paper, experts and investigators agree, the Deepwater Horizon should have weathered this blowout. This is the story of how and why it didn’t."
Oil industry veteran Bob Cavnar reached the same conclusion months ago and writes about it in a book published in October, "Disaster on the Horizon" (Chelsea Green Publishing, White River Junction, VT, 224 pages, $14.95). It's worth reading, along with the New York Times' account, which is "based on interviews with 21 Horizon crew members and on sworn testimony and written statements from nearly all of the other 94 people who escaped the rig. Their accounts, along with thousands of documents obtained by The New York Times describing the rig’s maintenance and operations, make it possible to finally piece together the Horizon’s last hours," according to The Times.
Cavnar's "Disaster on the Horizon" is one of the first comprehensive examinations of the causes of the disaster -- but it won't be the last, as the New York Times story shows. There's sure to be a federal report on the incident and I hope it won't whitewash the lack of industry and government preparedness that the April 20 explosion uncovered. I've already reviewed another book on the disaster, "Drowning in Oil" by Houston Chronicle business reporter Loren Steffy (link: http://archives.huntingtonnews.net/columns/101207-kinchen-columnsbookreview.html)
Cavnar, in the bluntest possible language, delivers a hard-hitting portrait of industry and government woefully unprepared to respond. A plain-spoken man who's risen from field hand to CEO, Cavnar witnessed the carelessness of the industry first hand when he was burned by a gas well fire in 1981. "Disaster on the Horizon" reveals explosive details: Collusion between BP and the government to hide the severity of the spill. The blowout preventer technology details -- why it failed. The behind-the-scenes story of the Obama administration's $20 billion deal with BP. How BP blamed others for their mistakes. BP's corner cutting on safety. The risky top kill procedure. Obama's failure to take advice from industry experts. "Disaster on the Horizon" provides a road map for ensuring this never happens again, if only those responsible will follow it -- something that is not inevitable due to the "not invented here" (NIH) mindset of bureaucrats: NIH means if they don't come up with the idea, it doesn't exist.
Cavnar slams his own industry for ignoring safety improvements and lobbying to end the moratorium on off-shore drilling as quickly as possible. His conclusion: Technology must be vastly improved before deep water drilling resumes. The industry had a chance to get started on this during the moratorium, but delayed and lobbied instead. Tougher regulations on deep water drilling should be enacted-in technology, disaster preparedness, and response operations. A comprehensive energy policy that creates a favorable environment for full-scale alternative energy development and conservation must be crafted.
Cavnar on the blowout of BP's Mississippi Canyon Block 252 well: "This is a tragedy that simply did not have to happen It was caused by bad design, bad judgment, hurried operations, and a convuluted management structure. Add in silenced alarms and disabled safety systems, and the result was inevitable." Above all, he adds near the end of his indispensible book: "I personally believe the cause was primarily human error; the managers on the rig simply failed to listen to the well as it became more and more dangerous." Listen to the well? Yes, Cavnar says that "In the oil and gas industry, many -- including me -- believe that wells can talk; you simply have to understand the language they're speaking and what they are saying."
In other words, the April 20 Deepwater Horizon/BP event was no accident, but a tragedy driven by the multiple mistakes -- a "perfect storm" of mistakes.
"Disaster on the Horizon" takes readers inside the disaster, exposing the decisions leading up to the blowout and the immediate aftermath. It includes personal accounts of the survivors, assembled from testimony during various investigations, as well as personal interviews with survivors, witnesses, and family. It also provides a layman's look at the industry, its technology, people, and risks. It deconstructs events and decisions made by BP, Transocean, and the US Government before and after the disaster, and the effects of those decisions, both good and bad. Cavnar explains what happened in the Gulf, explores how we arrived at deep water drilling in the first place and then charts a course for how to avoid these disasters in the future. The diagrams and illustrations explain the events much better than tose on the TV accounts I watched daily. "Disaster on the Horizon" is dedicated to the 11 men who died in the disaster. They're named and each is provided with a mini-biography.
In its comprehensive report on the disaster -- which I recommend to all readers of this review -- The Times comes to basically the same conclusion as Cavnar: "... crew members died and suffered terrible injuries because every one of the Horizon’s defenses failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all. At critical moments that night, members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive steps needed. Communications fell apart, warning signs were missed and crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response. The result, the interviews and records show, was paralysis. For nine long minutes, as the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge, no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave."
About the author
Bob Cavnar is a 30-year veteran of the oil and gas industry with deep experience in operations, start-ups, turn-arounds, and management of both public and private companies. He is currently chief executive officer of Luca Technologies, which harnesses natural processes to produce natural gas sustainably. Previously he was President and Chief Executive Officer of Milagro Exploration, a large, privately held oil and gas exploration firm based in Houston with operations along the Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi Gulf Coasts, and offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Cavnar holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Southern Methodist University in Dallas.
Publisher's web site: www.chelseagreen.com
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